EU Elections: The Role of Immigration Politics in the Elections

Living and studying within the multicultural crossroads of Rome, Marshall has immersed himself in the world of politics and history from his undergraduate studies at John Cabot University, to his current master’s studies at the American University of Rome. With keen interests across the aforementioned fields — among others – Marshall enthusiastically seeks a comprehensive understanding of the most pressing issues from a myriad of angles. As the world faces a whole host of trials and tribulations at a seemingly hastened pace, Marshall is determined to collaboratively arrive at a more constructive understanding of the world we live in – so that we may collectively act for a better tomorrow.

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Roberta Metsola during election night at the European Parliament in Brussels, Belgium, 2024. Source: (European Parliament)

An Election Post-Mortem

The European Union (EU) elections have come and gone this past June 6^th-9^th, with a widely anticipated shift to the political right materializing. The results of this rightward shift will have a dramatic impact in the years to come on the individual member states of the EU itself, as well as the broader European continent; therefore, it is imperative to critically engage with one of the most discussed about issues in the lead up to the election and analyze its impact – that being immigration.

What do Voters really want?

EU centrist and center leaning parties sought to stave off support for the far-right by passing a stricter immigration and asylum pact, ultimately appearing to concede the framing of the immigration debate to the far-right in what has been viewed as a futile and reckless effort. Even in the years preceding these most recent EU elections, this phenomenon of the far-right being able to exert pressure on mainstream EU politics — as centrist and center leaning parties continually adopted further rightwing positions and policies on immigration in particular – was well established. This shift to the right by the center came despite polling indicating that immigration was a concern, but not the top priority for EU voters, with the very same polling showing that the cost of living was in fact the number one concern. How then can one make sense of this shift to the right by the center, as well as the surge in support for the far-right in the two largest EU member states of France and Germany, if EU voters overall did not view immigration as a top concern?

France

It is undeniable that one of the most shocking results of the EU elections were the unprecedented gains made by Marine Le Pen’s Rassemblement National (RN) in France – receiving 31.37% of the vote, well ahead of French President Emmanuel Macron’s Renaissance with 14.6% in second place. Ahead of the EU elections, RN made sure that immigration was at the center of their platform; furthermore, President Macron had – in the same vein of other EU centrist and centrist leaning figures – passed a far-right influenced bill on immigration in France prior to the EU elections. Despite President Macron insisting that he had, “not betrayed voters who rallied behind [him] to stop the far right,” his very own immigration bill was endorsed by the far-right — with Le Pen claiming, “ideological victory.” However, the basis for RN’s victory in France may not lie entirely in immigration politics, as evidence by President Macron’s failed efforts to stave off -far-right support by passing stricter immigration legislation; in fact, it would appear that – similar to the EU overall – French voters found cost of living to beat out immigration to be their top priority. Now, with President Macron having called for snap parliamentary elections in France after RN’s victory in the EU elections, the reality of President Macron’s unpopularity is apparent with another projected election loss on the horizon for the embattled French President.

Germany

Arguably just as stunning as the results out of France, Germany likewise saw a shift to the right as a result of the EU elections, with the center-right Christlich Demokratische Union Deutschlands (CDU) and far-right Alternative für Deutschland (AFD) in first and second respectively with 30% and 15.9%. While a center leaning party was able to come out on top in Germany, the surge in support for the AFD and collapse in support for German Chancellor Olaf Scholz’ center-left Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (SPD) – coming in third with 13.9% — has led to a shock within German politics. The similarities between France and Germany do not stop there though, with the AFD, much like the RN, heavily promoting a stricter, far-right vision for immigration policies – having incited controversy late last year when it was discovered that members of the AFD met with other far-right and extremist figures to discuss the mass deportation of immigrants and “non-assimilated” Germans termed as “remigration.” Furthermore, Chancellor Scholz seemingly followed in President Macron’s footsteps in seeking to stymie far-right support by promoting stricter immigration policies as well – despite German voters holding both peace and social security as their to priorities; however, much like President Macron, these efforts by the center to outflank the far-right on immigration have seemingly failed, with Chancellor Scholz and his coalition government as unpopular as ever as well. The only difference in this case being that Chancellor Scholz has ruled out snap elections. This presents a peculiar picture though, one in which EU voters have clearly indicated that the cost of living is their top priority, only for the incumbent political center to instead seek to outflank the far-right on immigration — something that has been established to be both futile and reckless.

Far from a Far-Right Sweep

To complicate matters even further, outside and France and Germany, the concession of the framing of the immigration debate to the far-right appears even more counterintuitive. It is true that Giorgia Meloni’s far-right Fratelli d’Italia (FDI) did indeed come in first in Italy this past EU elections with 28% of the vote, and that FDI has a similar vision to immigration of that of RN and the AFD – having passed a bill to send immigrants to Albania recently; however, that is not the complete story of Italy’s EU elections. Just behind in second place though was Elly Schlein’s center-left Partito Democratico (PD) with 24% of the vote – the party’s first EU elections under Schlein, and a healthy turnaround from PD’s last EU election showing of 19%. Despite not coming in first, the strong showing for PD who openly promoted a campaign counter to that of the right under a leader viewed as leftwing, further punctures the methodology of centrist actors seeking to outflank the far-right on immigration. In addition to the turnaround of PD in Italy, the Nordic countries saw a rejection of the center and far-right across Denmark, Sweden, and Finland in favor of left and even far-left candidates and parties. Danish media in particular interpreted the results in Denmark as a rebuke against the incumbent centrist government of Prime Minister Mette Frederiksen; something both President Macron and Chancellor Scholz can seemingly relate with.

Elly Schlein and PD celebrations after election results in Italy, 2024. Source: (ANSA)

The Reality of the Situation

There will be a lot made of the role of immigration politics and rhetoric in these most recent EU elections, but that role is not entirely what it seems to be. The impact of such discourse and policies of course must not be ignored – with Vincent Cochetel, the UN refugee agency’s special envoy for the central and western Mediterranean, warning of the dangers such anti-immigrant discourse could have on influencing global politics ahead of the EU elections, in addition to the aforementioned far-right parties of RN, AFD, and FDI having all already clearly influenced or passed anti-immigrant legislation. However, the stinging losses suffered by incumbent centrists, the resurgence of the left in some areas, and polling showing that EU voters’ primary concern is the cost of living rather articulates a frustration towards incumbent politics and a lack of addressing the primary economic concern more than it alludes to a voter preference for far-right policies on immigration.

Recommendations for Policy Makers

Tackle the most pressing issue to voters: the cost of living.
Move away from efforts to outflank the far-right on immigration, and instead build up a united immigration policy rooted in the EU’s principles.
Focus on greater inclusivity and diversity as an inherent strength of the EU.